David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):1-25 (1968)
THE aim of this paper is to refute Hume's contention that there cannot be logically necessary connections between successive events. I intend to establish, in other words, not 'Logically necessary connections do exist between successive events', but instead the rather more modest proposition: 'It may be, it is possible, as far as we can ever know for certain, that logically necessary connections do exist between successive events.' Towards the end of the paper I shall say something about the implications of rejecting Hume's contention.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Maxwell (2010). Reply to Comments on Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom. Philosophia 38 (4):667-690.
Similar books and articles
Mark Bevir (2000). Historical Explanation, Folk Psychology, and Narrative. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):152 – 168.
Andrew Ward (2008). Proof and Demonstration: Hume's Account of the Causal Relation. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):23-37.
Louis deRosset (2009). Production and Necessity. Philosophical Review 118 (2):153-181.
Władysław Krajewski (1997). Energetic, Informational, and Triggering Causes. Erkenntnis 47 (2):193-202.
Aisling Crean (2010). Humean Humility. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy (Special Issue edited by Helen Beebee and Markus Schrenk) 13.
Wes Morriston (2010). Beginningless Past, Endless Future, and the Actual Infinite. Faith and Philosophy 27 (4):439-450.
William F. Vallicella (1999). God, Causation and Occasionalism. Religious Studies 35 (1):3-18.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads229 ( #1,961 of 1,100,757 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #16,869 of 1,100,757 )
How can I increase my downloads?