Philosophy of Science 29 (2):132-138 (1962)
|Abstract||Utilizing Carnap's notions of "questions [or assertions] within a framework" and "questions [or assertions] about a framework" and his account of A-truth (analyticity in the broad sense), a theory of the ontological status of entities--in particular, that of theoretical entities--is adumbrated. In addition to the usual L-rules, each conceptual framework considered embodies a set of sentences whose truth value is quickly decidable on other than purely linguistic grounds, a set of A-true formulae, and a set of rules for the confirmation and disconfirmation of non-L-true, non-A-true formulae which are not quickly decidable. Criteria which acceptable sets of A-true formulae must fulfill are given. Using this apparatus, a schema for a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is outlined|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ilkka Niiniluoto (2004). Tarski's Definition and Truth-Makers. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):57-76.
Ross P. Cameron (2010). How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249-264.
Stathis Psillos (2001). Studies in Scientific Realism. Foundations of Chemistry 3 (1):79-86.
Pierre Cruse (2004). Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
Bradley Dowden, Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dov Gabbay, Rolf Nossum & John Woods (2006). Context-Dependent Abduction and Relevance. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (1):65 - 81.
C. Ulises Moulines (2006). Ontology, Reduction, Emergence: A General Frame. Synthese 151 (3):313-323.
D. Bellé & F. Parlamento (2006). Truth in V for Ǝ ∀∀-Sentences Is Decidable. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (4):1200 - 1222.
Otávio Bueno (2000). Quasi-Truth in Quasi-Set Theory. Synthese 125 (1-2):33-53.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #36,484 of 548,999 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,320 of 548,999 )
How can I increase my downloads?