The rationality of scientific discovery part II: An aim oriented theory of scientific discovery

Philosophy of Science 41 (3):247-295 (1974)
In Part I (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41 No.2, June, 1974) it was argued that in order to rebut Humean sceptical arguments, and thus show that it is possible for pure science to be rational, we need to reject standard empiricism and adopt in its stead aim oriented empiricism. Part II seeks to articulate in more detail a theory of rational scientific discovery within the general framework of aim oriented empiricism. It is argued that this theory (a) exhibits pure science as a rational enterprise (b) enables us to resolve problems associated with the key notions of simplicity and intelligibility (c) has important implications both for philosophy of science and for scientific practice itself.
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DOI 10.1086/288592
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Andreas Sommer (2014). Psychical Research in the History and Philosophy of Science. An Introduction and Review. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 48:38-45.

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Andrew Lugg (1985). The Process of Discovery. Philosophy of Science 52 (2):207-220.
Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Part Two: Aim-Oriented Empiricism and Scientific Essentialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101.

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