Frege on indexicals

Philosophical Review 115 (4):487-516 (2006)
It is a characteristically Fregean thesis that the sense expressed by an expression is the linguistic meaning of that expression. Sense can play this role for Frege since it meets fundamental desiderata for meaning, that it be universal and invariantly expressed and objectively the same for everyone who knows the language. It has been argued,1 however, that, as a general thesis about natural languages, the identi cation of sense and meaning cannot be sustained since it is in con ict with another characteristically Fregean thesis, that sense uniquely determines reference. The argument is quite simple and can be outlined as follows. Assume the two theses we have just stated.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2006-011
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,316
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Guy Longworth (2013). IV-Sharing Thoughts About Oneself. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):57-81.
Víctor M. Verdejo (2016). Understanding and Disagreement in Belief Ascription. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):183-200.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

1,033 ( #472 of 1,926,184 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

66 ( #5,232 of 1,926,184 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.