Correlations, deviations and expectations: the Extended Principle of the Common Cause

Synthese 190 (14):2853-2866 (2013)
The Principle of the Common Cause is usually understood to provide causal explanations for probabilistic correlations obtaining between causally unrelated events. In this study, an extended interpretation of the principle is proposed, according to which common causes should be invoked to explain positive correlations whose values depart from the ones that one would expect to obtain in accordance to her probabilistic expectations. In addition, a probabilistic model for common causes is tailored which satisfies the generalized version of the principle, at the same time including the standard conjunctive-fork model as a special case
Keywords Principle of the Common Cause  Correlation  Deviation  Expectation  Explanation
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G. Grasshoff (2005). Minimal Assumption Derivation of a Bell-Type Inequality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):663-680.

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