A limited defense of moral perception

Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320 (2010)
One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a necessary condition for coming to know that X is F by perception is the ability to have a perceptual experience that represents something as being F . Call this the ‘Representation Objection’ to moral perception. In this paper I argue that the Representation Objection to moral perception fails. Thus I offer a limited defense of moral perception.
Keywords Moral perception  Moral realism  Representation  Moral knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Austen Clark (2000). A Theory of Sentience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Terence Cuneo (2003). Reidian Moral Perception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):229 - 258.

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Citations of this work BETA
J. Jeremy Wisnewski (2015). The Case for Moral Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):129-148.
Robert Cowan (2015). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
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