David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320 (2010)
One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a necessary condition for coming to know that X is F by perception is the ability to have a perceptual experience that represents something as being F . Call this the ‘Representation Objection’ to moral perception. In this paper I argue that the Representation Objection to moral perception fails. Thus I offer a limited defense of moral perception.
|Keywords||Moral perception Moral realism Representation Moral knowledge|
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Michael Huemer (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan.
Michael Huemer (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Martha C. Nussbaum (1990). Love's Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Cowan (2015). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
Robert Cowan (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
Rafe McGregor (2015). Making Sense of Moral Perception. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):745-758.
David Faraci (2015). A Hard Look at Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.
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