Moral perception and the causal objection

Ratio 23 (3):291-307 (2010)
One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception – we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non-secondary, natural properties; or non-natural properties. 1.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00468.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,865
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Robert Cowan (2015). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
David Faraci (2015). A Hard Look at Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.
J. Jeremy Wisnewski (2015). The Case for Moral Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):129-148.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

87 ( #32,725 of 1,724,891 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #134,554 of 1,724,891 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.