A method for interpreting continental and analytic epistemology

Abstract
Current investigations in epistemology tend to follow either the continental or the analytic school of thought. These schools of thought have different goals for epistemology and different procedures for achieving these goals. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the feasibility and profitability of communication between analytic and continental philosophy in epistemology. Wittgenstein's concept of language games will be used to frame the issue', continental and analytic philosophers play different language games. One can successfully interpret a particular language game from the perspective of another language game using the principle of charity. Specifically, the principle of charity allows analytic and continental epistemological to communicate profitably
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,404
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Simon Critchley (1997). What is Continental Philosophy? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):347 – 363.
Jennifer Saul, Feminist Philosophy of Language. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jack Reynolds (2009). "Continental Philosophy and Chickening Out". International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):255-72.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-06-08

Total downloads

2 ( #355,154 of 1,102,989 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #297,509 of 1,102,989 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.