Ascribing mental qualities to machines

In Martin Ringle (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence. Humanities Press (1979)
Abstract
Ascribing mental qualities like beliefs, intentions and wants to a machine is sometimes correct if done conservatively and is sometimes necessary to express what is known about its state. We propose some new definitional tools for this: definitions relative to an approximate theory and second order structural definitions
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    Citations of this work BETA
    John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    Bruce J. MacLennan (1988). Causes and Intentions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):519-520.
    J. A. Fodor (1980). Searle on What Only Brains Can Do. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):431.

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