A predictivist argument against scepticism

Analysis 72 (4):660-665 (2012)
Abstract
Predictivism, the thesis that all things being equal a hypothesis that predicts a piece of evidence is better supported by that evidence than a hypothesis that only accommodates that evidence, comes in strong and weak forms. Interestingly, weak predictivism, which is widely accepted, can be used to formulate a persuasive argument against some forms of external world scepticism. In this article I formulate this predictivist argument and I explain why it deserves serious consideration despite the fact that it only succeeds as a response to some forms of external world scepticism
Keywords Predictivism  Skepticism
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    References found in this work BETA
    David Harker (2008). On the Predilections for Predictions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.
    David Harker (2006). Accommodation and Prediction: The Case of the Persistent Head. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):309-321.
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