Can a Turing machine know that the Godel sentence is true?
Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):525-32 (1999)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | Language Logic Sentence Truth Turing Machines Goedel | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
D. King (1996). Is the Human Mind a Turing Machine? Synthese 108 (3):379-89.
G. Sereny (2011). How Do We Know That the Godel Sentence of a Consistent Theory Is True? Philosophia Mathematica 19 (1):47-73.
Justin Leiber (2006). Turing's Golden: How Well Turing's Work Stands Today. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):13-46.
Y. Sato & T. Ikegami (2004). Undecidability in the Imitation Game. Minds and Machines 14 (2):133-43.
Dale Jacquette (1987). Metamathematical Criteria for Minds and Machines. Erkenntnis 27 (July):1-16.
Robert F. Hadley (2008). Consistency, Turing Computability and Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. Minds and Machines 18 (1).
B. Jack Copeland (2002). Accelerating Turing Machines. Minds and Machines 12 (2):281-300.
Paul Benacerraf (1967). God, the Devil, and Godel. The Monist 51 (January):9-32.
Storrs McCall (1999). Can a Turing Machine Know That the Gödel Sentence is True? Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):525 - 532.
Neil Tennant (2001). On Turing Machines Knowing Their Own Gödel-Sentences. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1).
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads48 ( #22,433 of 549,510 )Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #8,956 of 549,510 )How can I increase my downloads? |

