Defending normative naturalism: A reply to Ellen Klein

Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):299 – 305 (1992)
Abstract
Rejecting Klein's claims that normative epistemology and naturalism are mutually exclusive, I defend the normative naturalism of my "Epistemology in an Age of Cognitive Science". When insisting that epistemic standards simultaneously external to, superior to, and independent of those of science do not exist, I hold neither that science exhausts standards of rationality nor that relevant extra-scientific considerations do not exist. Cognitive science may transform how we pose some normative questions in epistemology. Concurring with Klein that the burden of evidence resides with normative naturalism, I explore suggestive proposals that Churchland and Thagard have offered on just this front
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Ellen R. Klein (1992). Is 'Normative Naturalism' an Oxymoron? Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):287 – 297.

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