David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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University of Chicago Press (1995)
While the notion of the mind as information-processor--a kind of computational system--is widely accepted, many scientists and philosophers have assumed that this account of cognition shows that the mind's operations are characterizable independent of their relationship to the external world. Existential Cognition challenges the internalist view of mind, arguing that intelligence, thought, and action cannot be understood in isolation, but only in interaction with the outside world. Arguing that the mind is essentially embedded in the external world, Ron McClamrock provides a schema that allows cognitive scientists to address such long-standing problems in artificial intelligence as the "frame" problem and the issue of "bounded" rationality. Extending this schema to cover progress in other studies of behavior, including language, vision, and action, McClamrock reinterprets the importance of the organism/environment distinction. McClamrock also considers the broader philosophical question of the place of mind in the world, particularly with regard to questions of intentionality, subjectivity, and phenomenology. With implications for philosophy, cognitive and computer science, AI, and psychology, this book synthesizes state-of-the-art work in philosophy and cognitive science on how the mind interacts with the world to produce thoughts, ideas, and actions.
|Keywords||Philosophy of mind Philosophy and cognitive science Knowledge, Theory of Existential phenomenology Cognition Philosophy|
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|Buy the book||$6.51 used (86% off) $29.99 new (34% off) $42.64 direct from Amazon (6% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.M36 1995|
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Citations of this work BETA
Robert D. Rupert (2011). Cognitive Systems and the Supersized Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (3):427 - 436.
Dan Zahavi (2008). Internalism, Externalism, and Transcendental Idealism. Synthese 160 (3):355 - 374.
Anthony Chemero & Michael Silberstein (2008). After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science. Philosophy of Science 75 (1):1-27.
Nicoletta Orlandi (2010). Are Sensory Properties Represented in Perceptual Experience? Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):721-740.
Fred A. Keijzer & Maurice K. D. Schouten (2007). Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Synthese 158 (1):109 - 125.
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