David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethics 110 (4):749-779 (2000)
The article takes as its starting point the assumption that (a) competing accounts of moral rules should be judged by the distribution of benefits and burdens which would arise from everyone accepting these rules, and that (b) these benefits and burdens are understood in a way which has a substantial resource or freedom-based component. This starting point is compatible with contractualism and various forms of rule consequentialism, and will yield a morality in which people have significant freedoms. The main claim of the article is that as a consequence of these freedoms, and because of phenomena connected with cost internalization, this morality will also impose strong constraints on harming and weak constraints on allowing harm. Thus the starting point ends up vindicating commonsense morality.
|Keywords||Making and allowing Killing versus letting die Harming Deontology Contractualism Rule consequentialism Liability Consent|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Huseby (2008). Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor. Res Publica 14 (1):1-18.
Xiaofei Liu (2012). A Robust Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. Utilitas 24 (01):63-81.
Similar books and articles
Floris Tomasini (2009). Is Post-Mortem Harm Possible? Understanding Death Harm and Grief. Bioethics 23 (8):441-449.
Fiona Woollard (2010). Doing/Allowing and the Deliberative Requirement. Ratio 23 (2):199-216.
Kerry Gutridge (2010). Safer Self-Injury or Assisted Self-Harm? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):79-92.
Timothy Hall (2008). Doing Harm, Allowing Harm, and Denying Resources. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):50-76.
Saul Smilansky (1997). Should I Be Grateful to You for Not Harming Me? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):585-597.
Saul Smilansky (1997). Should I Be Grateful to You for Not Harming Me? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):585 - 597.
Elizabeth Harman (2009). Harming as Causing Harm. In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. 137--154.
James Stacey Taylor (2008). Harming the Dead. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:185-202.
P. Markwick (2002). Harming Consent. Res Publica 8 (2):157-162.
Samuel C. Rickless (2011). The Moral Status of Enabling Harm. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):66-86.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads48 ( #39,646 of 1,413,133 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #66,796 of 1,413,133 )
How can I increase my downloads?