Intentional action and intending: Recent empirical studies

Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748 (2005)
Recent empirical work calls into question the so-called Simple View that an agent who A’s intentionally intends to A. In experimental studies, ordinary speakers frequently assent to claims that, in certain cases, agents who knowingly behave wrongly intentionally bring about the harm they do; yet the speakers tend to deny that it was the intention of those agents to cause the harm. This paper reports two additional studies that at first appear to support the original ones, but argues that in fact, the evidence of all the studies considered is best understood in terms of the Simple View.
Keywords Action  Agent  Intending  Intentional  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1080/09515080500355236
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Knobe (2010). Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
Joshua Knobe (2007). Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.

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