Irreducibility and subjectivity

Philosophical Studies 67 (2):177-92 (1992)
...the problem possible at all...can never be answered on the basis of a prior knowledge of the transcendent [i.e. the external, spatio-temporal, empirical] matter whence the knowledge or the judgments are borrowed, not even if they are taken from the exact sciences.... It will not do to draw conclusions from existences of which one knows but which one cannot "see". "Seeing" does not lend itself to demonstration or deduction. [Husserl 1964a, pp. 2-3]
Keywords Metaphysics  Mind  Phenomenology  Subjectivity  Nagel, T
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DOI 10.1007/BF00373697
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Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.

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