David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):183-220 (2005)
Basic to Robert Brandom’s project in Making It Explicit is the demarcation of singular terms according to the structure of their inferential roles---rather than, as is usual, according to the kinds of things they purport to denote. But the demarcational effort founders on the need to distinguish extensional and nonextensional occurrences of expressions in terms of inferential roles; the closest that an inferentialist can come to drawing that distinction is to discern degrees of extensionality, and that is not close enough. The general moral applies as well to “two factor” theories of content: the notion of inferential role lacks the independence from the notion of denotation that many proponents of such theories have attributed to it.
|Keywords||Inferentialism Brandom, Robert B|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Tom Rockmore (2002). Brandom, Hegel and Inferentialism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (4):429 – 447.
John MacFarlane (2010). Pragmatism and Inferentialism. In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici. Routledge 81--95.
John McDowell (2005). Motivating Inferentialism: Comments on Making It Explicit (Ch. 2). Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):121-140.
Lionel Shapiro (2004). Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):141-60.
Gabor Forrai (2009). Brandom on Two Problems of Conceptual Role Semantics. In Barbara Merker (ed.), Vertehen nach Heidegger und Brandom.
Mark McCullagh (2005). Motivating Inferentialism. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):77-84.
Catherine Legg (2008). Making It Explicit and Clear: From "Strong" to "Hyper-" Inferentialism in Brandom and Peirce. Metaphilosophy 39 (1):105–123.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads63 ( #57,691 of 1,780,890 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #166,218 of 1,780,890 )
How can I increase my downloads?