John Searle's chinese room argument

John Searle begins his (1990) ``Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science'' with
``Ten years ago in this journal I published an article (Searle, 1980a and 1980b) criticising what I call Strong
AI, the view that for a system to have mental states it is sufficient for the system to implement the right sort of
program with right inputs and outputs. Strong AI is rather easy to refute and the basic argument can be
summarized in one sentence: {it a system, me for example, could implement a program for understanding
Chinese, for example, without understanding any Chinese at all.} This idea, when developed, became
known as the Chinese Room Argument.''
The Chinese Room Argument can be refuted in one sentence.
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