David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):77-84 (2005)
Robert Brandom has supported his inferentialist conception of semantic content by appealing to the claim that it is a necessary condition on having a propositional attitude that one appreciate the inferential relations it stands in. When we see what considerations can be given in support of that claim, however, we see that it doesn’t even motivate an inferentialist semantics. The problem is that that claim about what it takes to have a propositional attitude does nothing to show that its inferential relations are a feature of its content rather than of the relation that the subject stands in to that content—that is, the attitude.
|Keywords||Inferentialism Brandom, Robert B|
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Daniel Whiting (2008). Meaning Holism and de Re Ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 575-599.
Víctor M. Verdejo (2014). Disbelieving the Normativity of Content. Acta Analytica 29 (4):441-456.
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