David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):343-54 (1991)
The issue of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and psychology has received enormous attention and discussion in the decade since the appearance Jerry Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism" [Fodor 1980]. But most of this discussion has focused on the consideration of the now infamous "Twin Earth" type examples and the problems they present for Fodor's notion of "narrow content". I think there is deeper and more general moral to be found in this issue, particularly in light of Fodor's more recent defense of his view in Psychosemantics [Fodor 1987]. Underlying this discussion are questions about the nature and plausibility of the claim that scientific explanation should observe a constraint of methodological individualism . My goal in what follows is to bring out this more general problem in Fodor's "internalist" account of the mental
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References found in this work BETA
Herbert A. Simon (1969). The Sciences of the Artificial. [Cambridge, M.I.T. Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
J. A. Fodor (1980). Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63.
E. Sober (ed.) (1994). Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology. The MIT Press. Bradford Books.
John Haugeland (1982). Weak Supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):93-103.
Citations of this work BETA
Ron McClamrock (1990). Marr's Three Levels: A Re-Evaluation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 1 (May):185-196.
Ron McClamrock (1993). Functional Analysis and Etiology. Erkenntnis 38 (2):249-260.
Ron McClamrock (1992). Irreducibility and Subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):177-92.
Ron McClamrock (1995). Screening-Off and the Levels of Selection. Erkenntnis 42 (1):107 - 112.
Brendan J. Lalor (1997). It is What You Think: Intentional Potency and Anti-Individualism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):165-78.
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