David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In S. Muggleton (ed.), Machine Intelligence 15. Oxford University Press (1996)
In AI, consciousness of self consists in a program having certain kinds of facts about its own mental processes and state of mind. We discuss what consciousness of its own mental structures a robot will need in order to operate in the common sense world and accomplish the tasks humans will give it. It's quite a lot. Many features of human consciousness will be wanted, some will not, and some abilities not possessed by humans have already been found feasible and useful in limited contexts. We give preliminary fragments of a logical language a robot can use to represent information about its own state of mind. A robot will often have to conclude that it cannot decide a question on the basis of the information in memory and therefore must seek information externally. Gödel's idea of relative consistency is used to formalize non-knowledge. Programs with the kind of consciousness discussed in this article do not yet exist, although programs with some components of it exist. Thinking about consciousness with a view to designing it provides a new approach to some of the problems of consciousness studied by philosophers. One advantage is that it focusses on the aspects of consciousness important for intelligent behavior.
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Andrea Stocco, Christian Lebiere & Alexei V. Samsonovich (2010). The B-I-C-a of Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (02):171-192.
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