Solitary and embedded knowledge

Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):161-169 (2000)
I argue for the usefulness of the distinction between knowledge that is, and knowledge that is not, acquired in such a way as necessarily to be acquired along with other knowledge so acquired. Knowledge gained in the latter ways—e.g. by testimony, by linguistic stipulation—has proved philosophically puzzling. But this is because philosophers have used traditional epistemological vocabulary to try to describe what’s distinctive about it. Using the solitary/embedded distinction, we can frame descriptions that are both true, and not stipulative-seeming, of what is distinctive of knowledge gained in these ways. I illustrate these points by discussing Saul Kripke’s claim that one can gain non-linguistic knowledge by linguistic stipulation.
Keywords contingent a priori
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview200016143
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Mark McCullagh, Solitary and embedded knowledge
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

50 ( #67,073 of 1,724,928 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

16 ( #47,062 of 1,724,928 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.