David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169 - 183 (2011)
I investigate what we mean when we hold people responsible for beliefs. I begin by outlining a puzzle concerning our ordinary judgments about beliefs and briefly survey and critique some common responses to the puzzle. I then present my response where I argue a sense needs to be articulated in which we do have a kind of control over our beliefs if our practice of attributing responsibility for beliefs is appropriate. In developing this notion of doxastic control, I draw from John Fischer's discussions of ?guidance control?. A central feature of this kind of control is the idea of ?ownership?. I argue that we can own our beliefs and that we expect each other to do so. We take responsibility for our beliefs and taking responsibility includes taking control of them. I end by considering objections to my view as well as some implications of it
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References found in this work BETA
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
William P. Alston (1988). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.
Pascal Engel (2009). Epistemic Responsibility Without Epistemic Agency. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.
Richard Feldman (2000). The Ethics of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
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