David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 52 (3):495 - 513 (1982)
A theory is presented which proposes that knowledge acquisition involves direct perception of schematic information in the form of structural and transformational invariances. Individual components with salient verbal descriptions are considered conscious place-holders for non-conscious invariant schemes. It is speculated that theories positing mental construction have three related causes: The first is a lack of consciousness of the schema processing capacities of the right hemisphere; the second is the paucity of adequate words to express schematic relationships; and the last involves the dominance of verbal processes in consciousness. Philosophical theories are reviewed and schematic data relevant to biological survival is offered. Applications to education are suggested.
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References found in this work BETA
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1975). Problems and Theories of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Hannah Arendt (1981). The Life of the Mind. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Ernst Cassirer (1953). The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. New Haven, Yale University Press.
Gina Geffen, J. L. Bradshaw & G. Wallace (1971). Interhemispheric Effects on Reaction Time to Verbal and Nonverbal Visual Stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology 87 (3):415-422.
Edmund Husserl (1931). Ideas: General Introdution to Pure Phenomenology. New York, the Macmillan Company.
Citations of this work BETA
Andy Clark (1987). Meaning, Publicity and Epistemology. Theoria 53 (1):19-30.
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