David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300 (2013)
The first step in responding to the challenge of external world skepticism is to get clear on the structure of the skeptic’s argument. The most prominent varieties of skeptical arguments either rely on closure principles or underdetermination principles. The relationship between these two sorts of arguments is contentious. Some argue that these arguments can independently motivate skepticism. Others argue that they are really equivalent. I argue that although these two arguments are distinct, their independence is not as obvious as some have thought. The fact that these arguments are not equivalent is important because skeptical arguments that appeal to underdetermination principles cannot be refuted by simply denying closure. So, the strategy for responding to skepticism offered by Nozick/Dretske does not seem an adequate solution
|Keywords||Skepticism Underdetermination Closure Epistemic justification|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
John Hawthorne (2005). Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell.
Roger White (2005). Epistemic Permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
John Greco (2000). Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Ju Wang (2014). Closure and Underdetermination Again. Philosophia 42 (4):1129-1140.
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