The very idea of the phenomenological

Abstract
The phenomenological can be reduced to the intentional. Intentional states have a what-it-is-like, and there is no special phenomenal object of introspection
Keywords Externalism  Metaphysics  Mind  Phenomena
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    Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Experiencing Speech. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):305-332.
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