David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 25 (3):285-298 (2009)
The metaphysical dispute between moral realists and antirealists is cast in terms of properties: the realist holds that moral properties exist, the antirealist denies this claim. There is a longstanding philosophical dispute over the nature of properties, and the obscurity of properties may make the realist/antirealist dispute even more obscure. In the spirit of deflationary theories of truth, we can turn to a deflationary theory of properties in order to clarify this issue. One might reasonably worry that such an account of properties would not be capable of properly characterizing disputes regarding the existence or nonexistence of genuine moral properties. In this paper, I will show that, within this framework, the traditional disputes over the existence of moral properties can be characterized in a far clearer fashion than is usually the case. A deflationary account of properties, along with an explanatory hierarchy of properties, makes the dispute in ontology clear
|Keywords||ontology metaethics deflationism realism properties|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Stephen R. Schiffer (2003). The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press.
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
G. E. Moore (1903/2004). Principia Ethica. Dover Publications.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ralph Wedgwood (1999). The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):199-215.
Shaun Nichols & Trisha Folds-Bennett (2003). Are Children Moral Objectivists? Children's Judgments About Moral and Response-Dependent Properties. Cognition 90 (2):23-32.
Matthew Chrisman (2005). Review of Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (1):250-255.
Jordan Howard Sobel (2001). Blackburn's Problem: On its Not Insignificant Residue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
Aaron Smuts (2011). Grounding Moralism: Moral Flaws and Aesthetic Properties. Journal of Aesthetic Education 45 (4):34-53.
Andy Egan (2004). Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):48 – 66.
Luca Moretti (2008). The Ontological Status of Minimal Entities. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):97 - 114.
Added to index2009-10-31
Total downloads53 ( #64,560 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #48,707 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?