Against maxcon simples

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):265 – 275 (2003)
In a recent paper titled 'Simples', Ned Markosian asks and answers the Simple Question, which is, 'under what circumstances is it true of some object that it has no proper parts?' Markosian's answer to the simple question is MaxCon , which states that an object is a simple if and only if it is a maximally continuous object. I present several arguments against MaxCon.
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Ned Markosian (forthcoming). The Right Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
Kris McDaniel (2007). Extended Simples. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131 - 141.
Shieva Kleinschmidt (2011). Multilocation and Mereology. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):253-276.
Hud Hudson (2007). Simples and Gunk. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):291–302.
Joshua Spencer (2010). A Tale of Two Simples. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):167 - 181.

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