A vehicle with no wheels
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):161-161 (1999)
| Abstract | O'Brien & Opie's theory fails to address the issue of consciousness and introspection. They take for granted that once something is experienced, it can be commented on. But introspection requires neural structures that, according to their theory, have nothing to do with experience as such. That makes the tight coupling between the two in humans a mystery. | |||||||||
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J.Ü, Rgen SchrÖ & der (1999). What has Consciousness to Do with Explicit Representations and Stable Activation Vectors? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):166-167.
Hugh Clapin (1999). What, Exactly, is Explicitness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):150-151.
Max Velmans (1999). Neural Activation, Information, and Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):172-173.
Joseph O'Rourke (1999). Why Information? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):163-164.
Fernando MartÃnez-Manrique (2004). Explicitness and Nonconnectionist Vehicle Theories of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):302-303.
George N. Reeke (1999). Getting the Vehicle Moving. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):165-166.
Michael S. C. Thomas & Anthony P. Atkinson (1999). Quantities of Qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):169-170.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2004). Vehicle, Process, and Hybrid Theories of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305.
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