Composition as identity does not entail universalism

Erkenntnis 73 (1):97-100 (2010)
Composition as Identity is the view that, in some sense, a whole is numerically identical with its parts. Compositional universalism is the view that, whenever there are some things, there is a whole composed of those things. Despite the claims of many philosophers, these views are logically independent. Here, I will show that composition as identity does not entail compositional universalism.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/40784452
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References found in this work BETA
Theodore Sider (2007). Parthood. Philosophical Review 116 (1):51-91.
Ross P. Cameron (2007). The Contingency of Composition. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). From Nihilism to Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):175 – 191.

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