Gunky Objects in a Simple World
Philo 9 (1):39-46 (2006)
| Abstract | Suppose that a material object is gunky: all of its parts are located in space, and each of its parts has a proper part. Does it follow from this hypothesis that the space in which that object resides must itself be gunky? I argue that it does not. There is room for gunky objects in a space that decomposes without remainder into mereological simples | |||||||||
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