David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 5 (5):412-425 (2010)
Philosophical questions concerning parts and wholes have received a tremendous amount of the attention of contemporary analytic metaphysicians. In what follows, I discuss some of the central questions. The questions to be discussed are: how general is parthood? Are there different kinds of parthood or ways to be a part? Can two things be composed of the same parts? When does composition occur? Can material objects gain or lose parts? What is the logical form of the parthood relation enjoyed by material objects?
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1997). Why Constitution is Not Identity. Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599-621.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
Donald L. M. Baxter (1988). Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense. Mind 97 (388):575-582.
Donald L. M. Baxter (1988). Many-One Identity. Philosophical Papers 17 (3):193-216.
Citations of this work BETA
L. A. Paul (2010). The Puzzles of Material Constitution. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):579-590.
A. J. Cotnoir (2013). Strange Parts: The Metaphysics of Non‐Classical Mereologies. Philosophy Compass 8 (9):834-845.
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Eric T. Olson (2006). Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood. Noûs 40 (4):738–752.
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Ross P. Cameron (forthcoming). Parts Generate the Whole, but They Are Not Identical to It. In Donald Baxter & Aaron Cotnoir (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press.
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