David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):251-274 (2009)
Friends of states of affairs and structural universals appeal to a relation, structure-making, that is allegedly a kind of composition relation: structure-making ?builds? facts out of particulars and universals, and ?builds? structural universals out of unstructured universals. D. M. Armstrong, an eminent champion of structures, endorses two interesting theses concerning composition. First, that structure-making is a composition relation. Second, that it is not the only (fundamental) composition relation: Armstrong also believes in a mode of composition that he calls mereological, and which he takes to be the only kind of composition recognized by his philosophical adversaries, such as David Lewis. Armstrong, accordingly, is a kind of pluralist about compositional relations: there is more than one way to make wholes from parts. In this paper, I critically evaluate Armstrong's compositional pluralism
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1991). Classes Are States of Affairs. Mind 100 (2):189-200.
D. M. Armstrong (1986). In Defence of Structural Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):85 – 88.
D. M. Armstrong (1989). Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Karen Bennett (2011). Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required). Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
Kris McDaniel (2010). Parts and Wholes. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):412-425.
Andrew Cullison (2010). Moral Perception. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
Kris McDaniel (2010). A Return to the Analogy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
Matteo Morganti (2011). The Partial Identity Account of Partial Similarity Revisited. Philosophia 39 (3):527-546.
Similar books and articles
Ralf M. Bader (forthcoming). Multiple-Domain Supervenience for Non-Classical Mereologies. In Ontological Dependence and Supervenience. Philosophia.
Kris McDaniel (2008). Against Composition as Identity. Analysis 68 (298):128–133.
William Bynoe (2011). Against the Compositional View of Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):91-100.
John Bolender (2006). Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which Are Basic and Which Are Derived? Philosophia 34 (4):405-410.
Joan Pagès (2002). Structural Universals and Formal Relations. Synthese 131 (2):215 - 221.
Javier Kalhat (2011). Is There A Quasi-Mereological Account of Property Incompatibility? Acta Analytica 26 (2):115-133.
Thomas Mormann (2010). Structural Universals as Structural Parts: Toward a General Theory of Parthood and Composition. Axiomathes 20 (2 -3):229 - 253.
Javier Kalhat (2008). Structural Universals and the Principle of Uniqueness of Composition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):57-77.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads76 ( #17,408 of 1,098,815 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #174,441 of 1,098,815 )
How can I increase my downloads?