True antecedents

Acta Analytica 22 (4):333-335 (2007)
In this note I discuss what seems to be a new kind of counterexample to Lewis’s account of counterfactuals. A coin is to be tossed twice. I bet on ‘Two heads’, and I win. Common sense says that (1) is false. But Lewis’s theory says that it is true. (1) If at least one head had come up, I would have won
Keywords Lewis  Counterfactuals  Conditionals  True antecedents
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0017-1
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Lee Walters (2014). Against Hypothetical Syllogism. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):979-997.

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