Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):465 - 470 (2009)
|Abstract||Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability; but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way.|
|Keywords||Truth Deflationary theory of truth Assertability|
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