David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 59 (1):19–35 (2005)
The Generality Problem for process reliabilism is to outline a procedure for determining when two beliefs are produced by the same process, in such a way as to avoid, on the one hand, individuating process types so narrowly that each type is instantiated only once, or, on the other hand, individuating them so broadly that beliefs that have different epistemic statuses are subsumed under the same process type. In this paper, I offer a solution to the problem which takes belief‐independent processes to be functions that take as inputs information about distal states of affairs, and produce beliefs as outputs. Processes are individuated narrowly, so as to avoid the latter aspect of the Generality problem, but, by holding process tokens to be of the same type when they take perceptually equivalent scenes as inputs, and produce beliefs of the same kind as outputs, the former aspect of the problem is avoided too. Having argued that this method of typing process tokens solves the Generality Problem, I then argue that my solution does not fall prey to objections that have been, or might be, raised for similar proposals
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Alvin Goldman (1979). ``What is Justified Belief?". In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel 1-25.
D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge. London,Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mark McEvoy (2014). Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Gettier Problem. Synthese 191 (17):4115-4130.
Mahmoud Morvarid (2013). Reference Failure, Illusion of Thought and Self‐Knowledge. Dialectica 67 (3):303-323.
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