David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Utilitas 22 (2):171-183 (2010)
Scalar consequentialism, recently championed by Alastair Norcross, holds that the value of an action varies according to the goodness of its consequences, but eschews all judgements of moral permissibility and impermissibility. I show that the strongest version of scalar consequentialism is not vulnerable to the objection that it is insufficiently action-guiding. Instead, the principle objection to the scalar view is simply that it leaves out important and interesting ethical judgements. In demonstrating this, I counter Rob Lawlor's contention that consequentialists cannot consistently care about permissibility and impermissibility
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References found in this work BETA
John Stuart Mill (2009). Utilitarianism. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press
Brad Hooker (2000). Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. Oxford University Press.
Liam B. Murphy (2000). Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory. Oxford University Press.
John Stuart Mill (1962). Utilitarianism. Cleveland, World Pub. Co..
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