The Lottery Puzzle and Pritchard's Safety Analysis of Knowledge

Duncan Pritchard's version of the safety analysis of knowledge has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and (the “safety principle”) in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the lottery puzzle. In this paper, I argue that the safety analysis of knowledge in fact fails to solve the lottery puzzle. I also argue that a revised version of the safety principle recently put forward by Pritchard fares no better
Keywords Safety  Knowledge  Lottery Problem  Pritchard
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2009_3
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,865
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Eugene Mills (2012). Lotteries, Quasi-Lotteries, and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):335 - 352.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

36 ( #89,738 of 1,724,879 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

15 ( #48,570 of 1,724,879 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.