David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):133 – 153 (1992)
Abstract The frame problem is a problem that arises when an agent attempts to assess the consequences of future behaviour. Strictly, it is a problem of modelling that arises during planning. The problem arises because many of the possible consequences of a planned action are not really relevant to the decision whether to perform the action. The frame problem is typical of the classical approach to artificial intelligence, but it is evident that animals do not suffer from this problem. In this paper it is suggested that animals can circumvent the frame problem because their decision?making architecture is very different from that traditionally used in artificial intelligence
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References found in this work BETA
John McCarthy & Patrick Hayes (1969). Some Philosophical Problems From the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence. In B. Meltzer & Donald Michie (eds.), Machine Intelligence 4. Edinburgh University Press 463--502.
Jerry A. Fodor (1986). The Modularity of Mind. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), Philosophical Review. Ablex 101-108.
David McFarland (1991). Defining Motivation and Cognition in Animals. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (2):153 – 170.
Citations of this work BETA
Armin Schulz (2013). The Benefits of Rule Following: A New Account of the Evolution of Desires. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 44 (4a):595-603.
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