David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):537-53 (1996)
In The Subjective View,' I defended (unoriginally) a dispositional theory of color and drew out some consequences of that theory. The dispositional theory (DT) maintains, roughly speaking, that for an object to instantiate a color property is for it to have a disposition to cause experiences as of an object having that property in normal perceivers in normal conditions. This theory has notable merits in capturing (assuming one wants them captured) the subjectivity and relativity of ascriptions of color, while allowing that it is external ob- jects themselves that are colored. It makes colors both sense depen- dent and object qualifying.2 But it runs into prima facie problems in giving a plausible account of the phenomenology of color percep- tion, as I ruefully observed in my earlier book (op. cit., pp. 132-37)
|Keywords||Aesthetics Color Content Epistemology Perception Subjectivity|
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Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
Brad J. Thompson (2010). The Spatial Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Pär Sundström (2007). Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
Adam Pautz (2006). Sensory Awareness is Not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
Bence Nanay (2011). Do We Sense Modalities with Our Sense Modalities? Ratio 24 (3):299-310.
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