Anomalous monism and Kripke's cartesian intuitions

Analysis 2 (January):78-80 (1977)
Abstract
It is argued that kripke's objections to the identity theory can be met by token theories. the crucial point is that the existence of the required qualitative counterparts is consistent with the absence of psychophysical correlations
Keywords Identity  Metaphysics  Monism  Davidson, D  Kripke, S
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