Consciousness and Its Objects

Oxford University Press University Press (2004)
Abstract
Colin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked papers, four of them previously unpublished. He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable. He also investigates the basis of our knowledge that there is a mind-body problem, and the bearing of this on attempted solutions. McGinn goes on to discuss the status of first-person authority, the possibility of atomism with respect to consciousness, extreme dualism, and the role of non-existent objects in constituting intentionality. He argues that traditional claims about our knowledge of our own mind and of the external world can be inverted; that atomism about the conscious mind might turn out to be true; that dualism is more credible the more extreme it is; and that all intentionality involves non-existent objects. These are all surprising positions, but he contends that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas.
Keywords Atomism  Body  Consciousness  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Mind  Object
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Call number B808.9.M34 2004
ISBN(s) 019926760X   9780199267606
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Mark Rowlands (2008). From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.
Daniel Stoljar (2009). Précis of Ignorance and Imagination. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):748-755.

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