Synthese 100 (2):197-239 (1994)
|Abstract||I defend a version of color subjectivism — that colors are sortals for certain neural events — by arguing against a sophisticated form of color objectivism and by showing how a subjectivist can legitimately explain the phenomenal fact that colors seem to be properties of external objects|
|Keywords||Color Mental Mind Objectivity Perception Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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