David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Constructivist Foundations 1 (1):19--34 (2005)
Purpose: This paper is a brief introduction to enactive cognitive science: a description of some of the main research concerns; some examples of how such concerns have been realized in actual research; some of its research methods and proposed explanatory mechanisms and models; some of the potential as both a theoretical and applied science; and several of the major open research questions. Findings: Enactive cognitive science is an approach to the study of mind that seeks to explain how the structures and mechanisms of autonomous cognitive systems can arise and participate in the generation and maintenance of viable perceiver-dependent worlds -- rather than more conventional cognitivist efforts, such as the attempt to explain cognition in terms of the ``recovery'' of (pre-given, timeless) features of The (objectively-existing and accessible) World. As such, enactive cognitive science is resonant with radical constructivism. Research implications: As with other scientific efforts conducted within a constructivist orientation, enactive cognitive science is broadly ``conventional'' in its scientific methodology. That is, there is a strong emphasis on testable hypotheses, empirical observation, supportable mechanisms and models, rigorous experimental methods, acceptable criteria of validation, and the like. Nonetheless, this approach to cognitive science does also raise a number of specific questions about the scope of amenable phenomena (e.g., meaning, consciousness, etc.) -- and it also raises questions of whether such a perspective requires an expansion of what is typically considered within the purview of scientific method (e.g., the role of the observer/scientist).
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Pierre De Loor, Kristen Manac’H. & Jacques Tisseau (2009). Enaction-Based Artificial Intelligence: Toward Co-Evolution with Humans in the Loop. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 19 (3):319-343.
Similar books and articles
Mog Stapleton (2013). Steps to a "Properly Embodied" Cognitive Science. Cognitive Systems Research 22 (June):1-11.
Marek McGann (2007). Enactive Theorists Do It on Purpose: Toward an Enactive Account of Goals and Goal-Directedness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):463-483.
Steve Torrance (2005). In Search of the Enactive: Introduction to Special Issue on Enactive Experience. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):357-368.
Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher (2012). Getting Interaction Theory (IT) Together: Integrating Developmental, Phenomenological, Enactive, and Dynamical Approaches to Social Interaction. Interaction Studies 13 (3):436-468.
Tom Froese (2009). Hume and the Enactive Approach to Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):95-133.
T. Ziemke (2011). Realism Redux: Gibson's Affordances Get a Well-Deserved Update. Constructivist Foundations 7 (1):87-89.
James S. Boster (2012). Cognitive Anthropology Is a Cognitive Science. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (3):372-378.
Dustin Stokes (2009). Aesthetics and Cognitive Science. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.
William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen (2010). Dynamic Mechanistic Explanation: Computational Modeling of Circadian Rhythms as an Exemplar for Cognitive Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):321-333.
Evan Thompson & Mog Stapleton (2009). Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories. Topoi 28 (1):23-30.
Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.) (2012). The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.
E. Margolis, R. Samuels & S. Stich (eds.) (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
John Stewart (2001). Radical Constructivism in Biology and Cognitive Science. Foundations of Science 6 (1-3):99-124.
Added to index2010-11-20
Total downloads15 ( #124,185 of 1,679,387 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #111,749 of 1,679,387 )
How can I increase my downloads?