Heidegger and Duns Scotus on Truth and Language

Review of Metaphysics 57 (2):339 - 358 (2003)
Abstract
In his 1916 _Habilitationsschrift Heidegger enriched Husserl's notion of categorial intuition with Scotus's theory of intellection. The individual is entirely intelligible, even if its intelligibility is never fully defined. The historically singularized thing (essence modified by _haecceitas) speaks a primal word to us, and this original verbum makes possible the inner word of understanding, the _verbum interius. Heidegger argues that if the thing is actually intelligible in its singularity, history cannot be disregarded as ineffable: it becomes a domain of fore-theoretical experience, which exhibits its own proper understandability, one that eludes the objectifications of judgment
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