Interpretation and knowledge maximization
Philosophical Studies 160 (3):391-405 (2012)
| Abstract | Timothy Williamson has proposed that we should give a ‘knowledge first’ twist to David Lewis’s account of content, maintaining that for P to be the content of one’s belief is for P to be the content that would be attributed by an idealized interpreter working under certain constraints, and that the fundamental constraint on interpretation is a principle of knowledge maximization. According to this principle, an interpretation is correct to the extent that it maximizes the number of knowledgeable judgments the subject comes out as making. Here I will argue against knowledge maximization and two fallback positions suggested by Williamson’s discussion. Williamson intends the principle of knowledge maximization to form the basis of an argument against a certain sort of skepticism about judgment. In the final section I argue that the kind of general response to judgment skepticism envisaged by Williamson is neither desirable nor necessary | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,664 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJérôme Dokic & Paul Égré (2009). Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge. Synthese 166 (1):1 - 20.
Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh (2004). Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
Dylan Dodd (2007). Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743-747.
Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743-747.
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2005). Williamson on Knowledge, Action, and Causation. Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy 6:15-28.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2011). Linguistic Know-How: The Limits of Intellectualism. Theoria 77 (1):71-86.
Frank Hindriks (2007). The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
P. D. Magnus & Jonathan Cohen (2003). Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):37-52.
Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.) (2009). Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Brian Weatherson (2004). Luminous Margins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):373 – 383.
David Bzdak (2008). On Amnesia and Knowing-How. Techné 12 (1):36-47.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-04-14Total downloads44 ( #25,292 of 549,017 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,261 of 549,017 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
