Inverted first-person authority

The Monist 87 (2):237-254 (2004)
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Abstract

Generally speaking, we can distinguish facts from our ways of knowing about them. On the one hand, there is a property instantiated by an object; on the other, there is our knowledge of this instantiation. The instantiation of the property is one thing; the faculty by means of which we detect it is another. This distinction simply reflects the familiar realist separation between ontology and epistemology: the object of knowledge is not to be conflated with the knowledge itself. Knowledge is a relational matter, an interaction between an object and a knowing subject; so the idea of a conceptual inseparability between a fact and a given way of knowing about it sounds wrong as a matter of deep principle. The objectivity of a fact seems to imply that it can always be conceptually distinguished from our means of gaining epistemic access to it.

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Subjectivism and the Mental.Giovanni Merlo - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):311-342.

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