Memory and epistemic conservatism

Synthese 157 (1):1 - 24 (2007)
Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory.
Keywords Rational belief  Memory  Knowledge  Justification  Epistemic conservatism
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DOI 10.2307/27653540
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Jordi FernÁndez (2015). Epistemic Generation in Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.

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