David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 157 (1):1 - 24 (2007)
Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory.
|Keywords||Rational belief Memory Knowledge Justification Epistemic conservatism|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Reid (2002). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Pennsylvania State University Press.
Thomas Reid (2002/1971). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Pennsylvania State University Press.
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Declan Smithies (2013). The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.
Abelard Podgorski (forthcoming). Dynamic Permissivism. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
Kevin McCain (2012). Against Hanna on Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 27 (1):45-54.
Jordi Fernández (2015). Epistemic Generation in Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).
Ted Poston (2012). Is There an 'I' in Epistemology? Dialectica 66 (4):517-541.
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