Oppressive speech

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):389 – 407 (2009)
Abstract
I here present two different models of oppressive speech. My interest is not in how speech can cause oppression, but in how speech can actually be an act of oppression. As we shall see, a particular type of speech act, the exercitive, enacts permissibility facts. Since oppressive speech enacts permissibility facts that oppress, speech must be exercitive in order for it to be an act of oppression. In what follows, I distinguish between two sorts of exercitive speech acts (the standard exercitive and the covert exercitive) and I argue that each such exercitive affords a distinct model of oppressive speech.
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References found in this work BETA
Jennifer Hornsby (1995). Disempowered Speech. Philosophical Topics 23 (2):127-147.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mary Kate McGowan (2009). Debate: On Silencing and Sexual Refusal. Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (4):487-494.
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