Probabilities and the fine-tuning argument: A sceptical view

Mind 110 (440):1027-1038 (2001)
Proponents of the Fine-Tuning Argument frequently assume that the narrowness of the life-friendly range of fundamental physical constants implies a low probability for the origin of the universe ‘by chance’. We cast this argument in a more rigorous form than is customary and conclude that the narrow intervals do not yield a probability at all because the resulting measure function is non-normalizable. We then consider various attempts to circumvent this problem and argue that they fail.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/110.440.1027
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Mark Douglas Saward (2014). Collins' Core Fine-Tuning Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (2):209-222.

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